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Abstract
Ethereum represents new innovation in the fields of cryptocurrency which has become
relatively stagnate, promising many things, including an entire programming language and
development enviroment built into the network. However the current trend is to write imple-
mentations and proof of concepts before doing the rigor involved with proving security. Miller’s
recent thesis is an attempt to remedy this, and we apply his provable security techniques to
the algorithm description of CASPER, the new “proof-of-stake" consensus protocol scheme to
be implemented in ethereum. We conclude by stating it satisfies almost all the definitions,
except one, leaving room for improvement.
1 Introduction
A very recent field, cryptocurrencies have made their way into spotlight. Cryptocurrencies are
virtual currencies that are not administered by any state or corporate entity, but rather exist solely
within a decentralized peer-to-peer network that anyone can join. Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency,
has operated with essentially uninterrupted service and significant growth since its launch in 2009.
Since money is involved, security is of paramount concern.As they allow open participation from
anonymous users, cryptocurrencies derive their security from the strength of underlying network
protocol itself. Although Bitcoin has been an empirical success thus far, it is difficult to reason
about its security. Miller[1] has attempted to remedy this in and provide a provable security
approach to this usually implementation heavy field.
CASPER[2] is a security-deposit based economic consensus protocol. This means that nodes, so
called “bonded validators”, have to place a security deposit (an action they call “bonding”) in order
to serve the consensus by producing blocks. The protocol’s direct control of these security deposits
is the primary way in which Casper affects the incentives of validators. If a validator produces
anything that Casper considers “invalid”, their deposit are forfeited along with the privilege of
participating in the consensus process. The use of security deposits addresses the “nothing at
stake" problem [3]; which suggests that deviation from the protocol is likely to put you at a
disadvantage rather than an advantage. In this project we try to fit Miller’s definition of provable
security into CASPER.
2 Motivation and Background
2.1 Consensus Protocol
Consensus protocols are a field of research which tries to answer the following question "How can
n equal parties come to an agreement for some problem?" This has many applications to networks
where there is no central authority, but decisions still need to be made and enforced. We discuss
methods of obtaining distributed consensus in this section.
2.2 Proof of Work
A proof-of-work (PoW) scheme is a protocol that is difficult to compute but easy to check. The
idea is security is reliant upon real world resources, in this case time and hardware. In practice
they are often based on hash functions. (With H a collision resistant hash function, For what s,
is H(s) = 0n ? What about 0n+1? and so on.) The only way to solve these problems requires
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a search of the message space which takes a lot of computing power and much of the security is
derived from the security of the hash function.
2.3 Proof of Stake
PoW has many problems. It is estimated that the entire bitcoin network will use as much electricity
as Denmark by 2020 [4]. Proof-of-stake (PoS) is a protocol in which attempts to fix some of
PoW’s problems. Mining is no longer done on expensive hardware, but rather ’simulated’ through
probabilities. The resources expended this time are not cpu cycles, but rather the currency itself.
For the case of ethereum, you commit to some amount of your coins as your “stake" and after
certain time (currently decided as four months) you are rewarded with your coins back plus some
interest. This model is very similar to keeping your money in a bank for its interest rate or a
gambling game with a high expected return rate. Proof of Stake has been called “non-trivial” to
implement by the ethereum developers. [5]
2.4 Ethereum
Ethereum is a new cryptocurrency that differs quite a bit from other coins. Ethereum promises
an entire programming language and development enviroment built on top of the security of the
blockchain. [6]
3 Scratch Off Puzzles
3.1 Definition
A scratch off puzzle as defined in [1] is a tuple (d, t, t0, γ) and a set of three algorithms:
• G(1λ)→ params
• Work(puz,m)→ ticket
• Verify(puz,m, ticket)→ {0, 1}
(d, t, t0, γ) each mean difficulty, amount of work per puzzle, initialization overhead of the algorithm,
and γ is the amount an adversary can have an advantage over an honest worker. The optimal
idea is that γ is as close to 1 as possible. G initialized all public parameters. Work takes a
puzzle instance puz and a payload m and outputs a ticket instance ticket. Verify takes a puzzle
instance, a payload, and a ticket and outputs either 1, or 0. Notice the similiarities between this
and the triplet of algorithms common in encryption schemes, namely key generation, encryption,
and decryption.
3.2 Proofs
A scratch off puzzle must satisfy three requirements
1. Correctness: For any (puz,m, ticket), if Workticket(puz,m) 6=⊥ then Verify(ticket, puz,m) =
1
2. Parallel Feasiblity: The honest Work algorithm can be parallelized without much loss,
formally:
Pr

params← G(1λ)
{puzi,mi}i∈[q] ← A
∀i : ticketi ←Workt(puzi,mi)
∃i : V erify(puzi,mi, ticketi)→ 1
 ≥ ζ(1, qt, 2−d)± negl(λ)
3. γ-Incompressibility: The work for solving a puzzle must be “incompressible" The best
possible adversary must not be able to speed up the work faster than a factor of γ. Formally:
Pr

params← G(1λ)
{puzi,mi, ticketi}i∈[l] ← AWork
all {puzi}i∈[l] are distinct and
∀i ∈ [l] : V erify(puzi,mi, ticketi) = 1 and
(puzi,mi) 6∈ Q
 ≤ ζ(l, γt, 2−d)± negl(λ)
2
With Q being the transcript of queries to the Work oracle by our adversary A. Notice that
the property of non-malleability (IND-CCA) is built into this definition. The adversary is
allowed to see as many valid puzzle, payload, and ticket instances as he pleases, but is unable
to forge his own without doing Work.
We also define the ζ function from above as:
ζ(l, t, d) = 1−
l∑
i
(
t
i
)
2−di(1− 2−d)t−i
which, informally can be described as "l sucesses after t independent Bernoulli trials each with
equal probability 2−d".
4 Ethereum as a Scratch Off Puzzle
4.1 Definition
Ethereum and CASPER is currently still in the design process, and may undergo revisions, so
this description (and subsequent proofs) are based off of a loose definition gathered from various
less-than-formal specs [7] [9]
The many variables of the specific implementation, such as gas, and stake, may be interpreted
as puzzle instances or payloads respectively. They are however, independent of the security
of the algorithm, so we wont worry about outfitting them.
• G(1λ)→ params
• α-Work(puz,m) :
For each round:
commit and pay to produce a new node.
return signiture of this node as ticket
• α-Verify(puz,m,ticket):
s
$← {0, 1} with some fixed, not necessarily uniform probability
return s
• β-Work(puz,m) :
For each round:
For the set of nodes N : apply stake to any subset of N you which is any amounts you
can
return the nodes you bet on, and the stakes you applied as ticket
• β-Verify(puz,m,ticket):
s
$← {0, 1} with some fixed, not necessarily uniform probability
Figure 1: The Ethereum Scratch Off Puzzle Algorithm Definition.
5 Proofs of CASPER
5.1 Correctness
Correctness is trivial in this case since our Verify algorithms are independent of the ticket and
return with some probability that is not 1.
3
Figure 2: An example of α-Work with three nodes from [9]
5.2 α-Work γ-Incompressibility
From [8] [11] we see that Pr[α − V erify → 1] = 23 . We also want to conduct only 1 trial, and
require it to be successful, therefore l = t = 1
Pr[α− V erify → 1] ≤ ζ(1, γ, d)
2
3
≤
1∑
1
(
γ
1
)
2−d(1− 2−d)γ−1
2
3
≤ γ2−d(1− 2−d)γ−1
We know that, realistically, d is a super exponential function of time (and its current value is well
over 1013). Analytically evaluating the expression and letting γ be a function of d, and taking the
limit d→∞ we see that γ → 1
5.3 α-Work Parallel feasibility
Pr[α− V erify → 1] ≥ ζ(1, qt, d)
2
3
≥
1∑
1
(
qt
1
)
2−d(1− 2−d)qt−1
2
3
≥ qt2−d(1− 2−d)qt−1
Letting q, t be reasonable constants for a polynomial adversary and taking the limit d→∞ we see
the inequality satisfies quite quickly.
5.4 β-Work γ-Incompressibility
There exists a set N of nodes of which an adversary may bet upon. Of these some S ⊂ N nodes
are chosen by the validators, with the nodes belonging to S have the highest bets of any node in
N . We wish to see if an adversary has some possible advantage. Consider if the adversary uses
the greedy algorithm, and places a bet on a single block (denoted b) with the greatest current
bets. Certainly b ∈ S if the round were to end immediately. Let s = |S|. Then b can be removed
from S if s(bets(b) + 1) bets are placed on nodes in N − S. Therefore if k is the total amount
of bets placed during the round, then s(bets(b) + 1) > k2 =⇒ Pr[b ∈ S] = 1 by the pigeonhole
principle. From [10] we see that s ∼ 0.4k. We also want S to vary as a function of t ∈ [0, 1] as time
progresses during the round (with 0, 1 being the start and end of the round, respectively). so we
let s = 0.4 · k · t · tblocktime where tblocktime is the actual blocktime constant (for bitcoin it is around
10 minutes, for ethereum, it is supposed to be a few seconds).
s(bets(b) + 1) = (bets(b) + 1)
4
10
· k · t · tblocktime > k
2
=⇒ t · tblocktime > 5
4(bets(b) + 1)
4
Certainly we see that as the network grows, bets(b)→∞ so the only restriction on t is that t > 0,
so the advantage of betting late diminishes extremely quickly for any sufficiently large network, so
we see that γ → 1
5.5 β-Work Parallel feasibility
The number of validators has been artificially set to a maximum of 8000 (80 shards with 100
validators per shard) [9] , as of current discussion. This was raised from an initial proposal of 250
after some concerns.[2]. We find that this arbitrary limitation, even with it being as high as 8000
will no less impact the theorectical feasibility. It appears that the inflation is inversely proportional
to the number of validators, so the odds of the protocol allowing more than some fixed amount is
unlikely. We find that, with this limitation, it is not parallelizable.
6 Conclusion
After analyzing the implementation plans for CASPER and applying the scratch off puzzle security
definitions, we have concluded that it satisfies most of the definition, except one.The implementa-
tion can be considered secure given if the given scheme can solve this hard cap on the number of
validators problem.
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